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The use of individual, social, 
and animated cue information 
by capuchin monkeys and children 
in a touchscreen task
Elizabeth Renner1,3*, Donna Kean1, Mark Atkinson1,2 & Christine A. Caldwell1
The distinctiveness of human cumulative culture raises the question of whether humans respond 
differently to information originating from social sources, compared with information from other 
sources. Further, does any such differential responding set humans apart from other species? We 
studied how capuchin monkeys and 2- to 5-year-old children used information originating from their 
own actions, those of a human demonstrator, or an animated cue. This information, presented via 
a touchscreen, always revealed in the first trial (T1) the reward value (rewarded or unrewarded) of 
one stimulus from a 2- or 3-item array, and could be used in a follow-up trial (T2) involving the same 
stimulus array. Two monkeys achieved a level of proficiency indicating their appreciation of the T1–T2 
relationship, i.e., reliably repeating rewarded (“win”) selections and actively avoiding repetition of 
unrewarded (“lose”) selections well above chance levels. Neither the two task-proficient monkeys 
nor the children showed overall performance differences between the three source conditions. Non-
task-proficient monkeys, by contrast, did show effects of source, performing best with individually-
acquired information. The overall pattern of results hints at an alternative perspective on evidence 
typically interpreted as showing a human advantage for social information use.
Human cultures are complex and elaborate, and influence many domains of behaviour. In comparison, ani-
mal cultures are generally restricted in complexity and domain. For example, cumulativity is a salient feature 
of human cultures, while thus far evidence indicates that it is either absent or more limited in non-human 
 species1–3. The transmission of most cultural behaviours requires social learning. If humans use social informa-
tion differently from non-human animals, this might explain the species difference in the qualities of cultural 
behaviours. To determine whether this might be the case, it is important to compare how humans respond to 
information from a social source (versus their own experience) and how non-humans respond to information 
from a social source (versus their own experience), and examine whether these groups show different patterns 
of information use. Generally, to compare the performance of humans and non-human primate species in tasks 
that involve social learning, researchers provide participants with varying amounts of information about how 
to solve the task. End-state conditions show a “solved” problem or  apparatus4–7; ghost conditions provide some 
information about object movement or other causal  relation7–14; and full social demonstrations show an agent’s 
body movements as well as changes to an  apparatus4–16. If the outcome achieved by the social demonstrator is 
repeated at a higher rate than outcomes revealed or shown in some other way, researchers usually conclude that 
social information has been given priority over other sources. However, there may be reasons that doing what 
another individual does or has done is in some way rewarding (regardless of whether an actual reward has been 
observed), and therefore more worth reproducing than an outcome presented in a different way. For example, 
the presence of a conspecific might draw an observer’s attention to part of an apparatus, with learning occurring 
as a byproduct of that attentional focus. Or an observer might have prior experience of reinforcement following 
the repetition of a conspecific’s actions, in which case their propensity to do something similar might be caused 
by generalisation of this learned association which would not apply in an individual learning context. This is 
because the natural behaviours performed by conspecifics are not random but rather constitute a subset drawn 
from the universe of possible behaviours; this subset is likely biased toward behaviours that have been previously 
rewarded with a  payoff17.
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In order to adequately address the question of how social and individual information are used, task dem-
onstrations should provide unambiguous cues regarding what to do as well as what not to do. Furthermore, 
these cues should be consistent across information sources: the same unambiguous cue should provide equiva-
lent information when acquired individually (i.e. through an individual’s own performance) or demonstrated 
socially. A task which flexibly provides information regarding either what should be repeated, or what should 
be avoided—in equivalent ways across sources—permits investigation of whether the source affects how these 
different types of information are responded to, relative to one another. This is a key question in understanding 
whether information from a social source is treated as if it had some kind of special (or simply different) status 
compared to information from other sources, which is independent of the inherent value of that information.
Tasks used to evaluate information use must also allow for fair comparisons between species. This can be 
difficult to achieve given that human children experience object-rich developmental contexts and generally 
have more opportunities to learn about affordances via object-based play than do non-human primates. In 
touchscreen tasks, stimuli can be varied such that each instance of a task is novel, and solutions do not rely on 
previously existing associations. This feature allows researchers to train participants to proficiency on a task, 
ensuring an understanding of a paradigm’s contingencies, and test them on novel instances of the task. The ability 
to train individuals to proficiency if required, and then present novel problems, allows for a fair(er) comparison 
between species.
In this study, we designed a touchscreen task that allowed for equivalent information to be presented in social 
and individual conditions, as well as a third, animated cue, condition (Fig. 1). On an initial “information trial” 
(T1), a participant received some information about one of the stimuli: whether it was rewarded (“win”), result-
ing in a raisin or sticker, or unrewarded (“lose”), resulting in no reward. Individuals were therefore required to 
respond to the information available on each trial, instead of adopting an indiscriminate (or “blanket”) copying 
 strategy18–20 or a blanket avoiding  strategy21,22. Good performance could be achieved by reliably re-selecting 
rewarded stimuli and reliably avoiding unrewarded stimuli. Including both types of information in T1s there-
fore allowed us to determine whether information type differentially affected performance in the various source 
conditions. For example, we could evaluate whether there were differences in copying of unreinforced responses 
in the social and individual conditions.
Figure 1.  Example 3-stimulus problems. (a) At the beginning of an information trial (T1) or test trial (T2), 
stimuli are displayed on the screen. (If this represents a T1, the following test trial would look identical to 
this screen.) (b) If a rewarded stimulus is selected, a visual cue (sunburst) is displayed and an auditory click is 
produced as feedback. If a monkey selected the rewarded stimulus, a food reward is also dispensed; if a child 
selected the rewarded stimulus, they are allowed to add a sticker to their sticker sheet. If an unrewarded stimulus 
is selected (not pictured), the stimuli disappear and only the background is visible. (c) An individual monkey 
interacting with the apparatus. This is a different problem from that displayed in (a,b).
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We compared the task performance of 2- to 5-year-old children and capuchin monkeys. Capuchins, as social 
primates with large brains and an omnivorous  diet23,24, are a useful comparison species with humans. Capuchins’ 
learning has been shown to be influenced by social  processes25,26, and they can socially transmit behaviours in 
diffusion chain  experiments27. While capuchin monkeys’ poor performance in tool-based tasks is  surprising28, 
they can achieve good performance in computerised tasks operated by  joystick29–31 or by  touch32. Our previ-
ous research has shown that children in this age range understand the contingencies of tasks like this with no 
 training33. However, we anticipated the need to train the monkeys on this task to ensure that they would treat 
the cues made available to them in T1 as information relevant to T2, whereas verbal scaffolding served to achieve 
this for the children (see “Methods” section).
The three information source conditions were individual, social, and animated cue. In the various conditions, 
the same information was available to the participant, but it was acquired by different means. In the individual 
condition, the participant selected one of the stimuli on T1 themselves. In the social condition, the adult human 
experimenter selected one of the stimuli. And in the animated cue condition, an animated hand appeared on 
the screen, and moved to make contact with (select) a stimulus before moving off the screen (see example video 
at https ://osf.io/pwt65 /). An information trial in the individual condition was therefore equally informative to 
an equivalent one in the social or animated cue condition.
The animated cue condition was included for several reasons. If a species difference in performance were to 
be found between the social and individual conditions, then the animated cue condition could be informative 
about the underlying mechanism. For example, if one group gives primacy to information that is the result of 
personal—individual—experience (e.g., participants have enhanced memory for their own responses, compared 
to anything experienced vicariously), then we would predict performance in the animated cue condition (along 
with the social condition) to be worse than that in the individual condition. And if one group responds to social 
information in special ways (e.g., they show a higher proportion of “repeat” or “stay” responses, even following 
unrewarded T1s, in the social  condition34, as the result of a conformity-like response or attribution of knowledge 
or expertise to the social model), their performance in the animated cue condition (along with the individual 
condition) would be expected to show a different pattern. Therefore, this condition should provide information 
about the scope and type of difference in relation to the question of whether it is the social or the individual 
condition that is treated distinctively.
Finally, the size of the array allowed us to evaluate the fidelity of learning by comparing “problems” (particular 
T1–T2 pairings involving a specific set of stimuli) with different chance levels of performance. If a participant 
has learned (or correctly inferred) what the information in T1 means, they should repeat the selected stimulus 
at similar rates regardless of the number of distractor stimuli. If a participant simply has a bias towards repeat-
ing responses that have been associated with a reward (over those that have not), we would expect their rates of 
repeating to be influenced by the number of distractors. If only humans use the T1 information in a high-fidelity 
manner (repeating or avoiding stimuli at similar rates regardless of the number of distractors), this may help to 
explain why human cultures increase in complexity while non-human ones appear not  to10. This is because, as 
solutions become increasingly less likely to be discovered through random exploration, the utility of (any kind 
of) information increases. If non-human primates use information in only a lower-fidelity manner, with rates of 
repetition or avoidance influenced by the number of distractors, this response pattern might not provide enough 
benefit to allow improbable but adaptive behaviours to persist, given the large number of alternative behaviours 
available in wild contexts. Results may therefore contribute to our understanding of why culture does (or does 
not) increase in complexity in various species.
Results
Task performance was measured in two ways. One measure was whether the selection from T1 was repeated 
on the next trial: the “repeats” measure. This variable was binary, and took a value of 1 if the stimulus selected 
on T1 had been repeated in T2, and a value of 0 if it had not. This measure is useful when comparing responses 
on problems with different numbers of stimuli and therefore different chance levels of performance. The other 
measure was whether, on a given trial, an individual used a win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) strategy. For example, if 
a participant saw a “win” in T1 and picked the same stimulus on T2, they had performed a win-stay; and if they 
saw a “lose” in T1 and picked a different stimulus on T2, they had performed a lose-shift (regardless of whether 
the shift had resulted in them finding the reward). This variable was also binary, and it took a value of 1 if a WSLS 
strategy had been used on a given trial, and a value of 0 if it had not.
Overall, the 29 children performed well on T2s but not at ceiling. They repeated the T1 selection after a win 
in 68% of 2-stimulus and 62% of 3-stimulus arrays, and repeated the T1 selection after a lose in 20% of 2-stimu-
lus and 22% of 3-stimulus arrays. Of the 15 monkeys who participated in testing, 2 (Inti and Torres) showed 
mastery of the task contingencies, as evidenced by > 75% WSLS performance on the experimental task. The two 
task-proficient monkeys also performed well but not at ceiling; they repeated the T1 selection after a win in 93% 
of 2-stimulus and 87% of 3-stimulus arrays, and repeated the T1 selection after a lose in 35% of 2-stimulus and 
31% of 3-stimulus arrays. The 13 non-task-proficient monkeys repeated the T1 selection after a win in 70% of 
2-stimulus and 56% of 3-stimulus arrays, and repeated the T1 selection after a lose in 52% of 2-stimulus and 38% 
of 3-stimulus arrays. See Table 1 for full details of performance by trial type, and the Supplementary Information 
for additional analyses.
Task-proficient monkeys: effects of source, information type, and array size. To examine task-
proficient monkeys’ performance using the repeats measure (Fig. 2), we built a GLMM with logit link in lme435, 
with a binary response variable of repeats; fixed effects of source (three levels: individual, social, and animated 
cue), information type in T1 (two levels: win and lose), array size (two levels: 2- and 3-stimulus arrays), and their 
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interactions; and a random effect of participant ID. However, this model resulted in a singular fit. We next built 
an equivalent Markov chain Monte Carlo GLMM in a Bayesian framework using the MCMCglmm  package36. 
This model had the same response variable and fixed and random effects as listed above; it had weak priors and 
was run with 100,000 iterations, a burn-in of 1000, and a thinning interval of 100. We assessed mixing and con-
vergence with trace and posterior plots. This model showed a main effect of information type (more repeats after 
win [90%] than lose [33%] T1s; Estimate =  − 206.0, 95% CI = − 350.5 to − 59.9, effective sample size [ESS] = 825.2, 
pMCMC < 0.001). There was also an interaction between source and information type (Estimate =  − 263.6, 95% 
CI =  − 526.0 to − 28.6, ESS = 736.1, pMCMC = 0.034). Main effects of array size (pMCMC = 0.40) and source 
(pMCMCs ≥ 0.12) were not significant, and the credible intervals for these main effects encompassed 0; other 
interaction effects were also not significant, with credible intervals encompassing 0 (pMCMCs > 0.24).
To examine the source-information type interaction, we split the data set by information type. We created 
MCMCglmms with source as the only fixed effect, participant ID as a random effect, and the same parameters 
as those listed above. For lose T1s, the main effect of source was not significant (all 95% CIs encompassed 0, 
pMCMC ≥ 0.26). For win T1s, the main effect of source was significant, with more repeats after a win in the 
individual (97%) than the animated cue (82%) condition (Estimate = 2.73, 95% CI = 0.72 to 4.80, ESS = 53.4, 
pMCMC = 0.01).
Children: effects of source, information type, and array size. To examine children’s performance 
using the repeats measure (Fig. 3), we built a GLMM with logit link in lme4, with a binary response variable of 
repeats, and fixed effects of source, information type, array size, and their interactions. A random intercept effect 
of participant ID and a by-participant random slope effect of session were included in the model. The main effect 
of source was not significant; full pairwise contrasts between all three source conditions using Tukey’s correc-
tion indicated that children did not differ in their repeating of the T1 selection between the individual and social 
(b =  − 0.53, SE = 0.45, Z =  − 1.2, p = 0.46), individual and animated cue (b =  − 0.23, SE = 0.44, Z =  − 0.53, p = 0.86), 
and social and animated cue (b = 0.30, SE = 0.48, Z = 0.63, p = 0.81) conditions. Information type had a significant 
effect, indicating more repeats after win than lose information trials (b =  − 2.5, SE = 0.48, Z =  − 5.3, p < 0.001). 
The main effect of array size was non-significant (b =  − 0.82, SE = 0.42, Z =  − 1.9, p = 0.054), but showed a trend 
Table 1.  Overall performance (percentage repeats) of children and capuchin monkeys in the various 































(N = 29) 62.9 14.8 68.5 18.3 69.6 23.0 65.0 21.8 71.4 22.0 54.2 27.8
Monkeys 
overall 91.9 50.5 81.4 42.0 60.8 45.8 51.0 33.0 70.0 48.0 55.6 35.4
Inti 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 83.3 50.0 87.5 33.3 83.3 50.0





90.6 58.9 77.3 44.2 51.3 48.1 43.0 34.2 65.5 48.1 50.0 35.6
Figure 2.  Task-proficient monkeys’ performance (as measured by T2 repeats), by source, information type, 
and array size. Bars show means of by-participant means, and error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. ani animated cue, ind individual, soc social.
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toward fewer repeats in 3-stimulus arrays. The interaction between information type and array size was also 
marginally non-significant (b = 1.23, SE = 0.65, Z = 1.90, p = 0.058). Other 2-way and 3-way interactions were not 
significant (all ps > 0.08).
Non-task-proficient monkeys: effects of source, information type, and array size. To examine 
non-task-proficient monkeys’ performance using the repeats measure (Fig. 4), we built a GLMM with logit link 
in lme4, with fixed effects of source, information type, array size, and their interactions. A random intercept effect 
of participant ID and a by-participant random slope effect of information type were included in the model. The 
main effects of source, information type, and array size were all significant. Full pairwise contrasts with Tukey’s 
correction for multiple comparisons showed that monkeys repeated more in the individual condition than in the 
social (b = 2.2, SE = 0.44, Z = 5.1, p < 0.001) and animated cue (b = 1.7, SE = 0.44, Z = 3.8, p < 0.001) conditions. The 
difference between the social and animated cue conditions was not significant (b =  − 0.55, SE = 0.33, Z =  − 1.7, 
p = 0.21). Like children and task-proficient monkeys, non-task-proficient monkeys repeated more after win than 
lose information trials (b =  − 0.77, SE = 0.34, Z =  − 2.3, p = 0.024). They also repeated more in 2-stimulus than 
3-stimulus arrays (b =  − 0.66, SE = 0.33, Z =  − 2.0, p = 0.045), in line with the change in baseline probability of 
selecting a given stimulus. The interaction between source and information type was significant. A post hoc 
comparison using the emmeans  package37 showed that the non-task-proficient monkeys repeated win selections 
more in the individual condition than the social (b =  − 1.9, SE = 0.29, Z =  − 6.6, p < 0.001) and animated cue 
(b = 1.5, SE = 0.29, Z = 5.1, p < 0.001) conditions; however, there was no such difference after lose trials (ps > 0.30).
Additional analyses. We examined the effects of two other variables, full details of which are in the Supple-
mentary Information. Briefly, task-proficient monkeys’ WSLS performance did not improve with post-training 
task experience (session number), while that of non-task-proficient monkeys actually decreased with post-train-
ing task experience. Children’s WSLS performance improved with task experience (session number). Addition-
ally, child age (in months) was a positive predictor of WSLS performance.
Figure 3.  Children’s task performance (as measured by T2 repeats), by source, information type, and array 
size. Bars show means of by-participant means, and error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. ani 
animated cue, ind individual, soc social.
Figure 4.  Non-task-proficient monkeys’ performance (as measured by T2 repeats), by source, information type, 
and array size. Bars show means of by-participant means, and error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. ani animated cue, ind individual, soc social.
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Discussion
Neither children nor task-proficient capuchin monkeys used social information in a distinctive way, as compared 
to other types of information. For children, there was no overall difference in performance—as measured by 
repeats—between the individual, social, and animated cue conditions. Researchers have previously found very 
good performance after social demonstrations of experimental  tasks8,10,15. However, here we show that when 
the amount and quality of information are controlled for, the nature of the information—its derivation from an 
individual, social, or animated source—may not be the definitive factor. In this study, the lack of performance 
differences between the individual, social, and animated cue conditions, combined with the general pattern of 
staying after wins and shifting after loses, indicated that children were able to make use of the information they 
received regardless of source.
The task-proficient capuchin monkeys showed a performance pattern similar to that of the children, with 
more repeating after wins than loses and no main effect of source. However, their performance differed from 
children’s in the interaction of source and information type. These monkeys repeated more after a win in the 
individual condition than in the animated cue condition, with no difference between the sources after a lose. It 
is possible that the poorer performance in the animated cue condition could reflect a real disadvantage in using 
disembodied information, since it accords with previous findings of reduced learning from so-called “ghost” 
conditions (discussed further below). However, it should be noted that both of the task-proficient monkeys had 
been trained to proficiency in the individual condition, which could account for their better performance at test 
in this condition. Regardless of any difference between individual and animated cue conditions, task-proficient 
monkeys were able to learn equivalently well in the social and individual conditions. That is, it was not between 
the social and individual conditions that performance differences manifested (see Fig. 2).
Children and task-proficient capuchins repeated the demonstrated selection more after a win than a lose 
information trial. That is, both groups were sensitive to the type of information they received in T1. Despite the 
shared pattern of more repeats after wins, however, each group’s overall performance pattern exhibited distinc-
tive characteristics in relation to information type. Specifically, children repeated the T1 selection less frequently 
than the capuchins. As we have previously  reported33, and in accordance with others’  results38, children exhibit a 
“shift” bias in tasks like this. That is, while they are sensitive to the reward information in T1, they have a (weak) 
tendency to shift from the initially selected stimulus after both wins and loses, resulting in better performance 
after lose T1s. By contrast, the task-proficient monkeys here showed, if anything, a “repeat” or “stay” bias, mean-
ing that overall, they repeated the T1 selection more frequently than the children. For example, in 2-stimulus 
problems after a win T1, children repeated on 68% of trials, compared to 93% for this same trial type for the 
task-proficient capuchins. After a lose T1 in 2-stimulus problems, children repeated on 20% of T2s, while task-
proficient monkeys repeated 35% of the time. We previously modelled children’s responses in a similar task; a 
model that incorporated a bias against repeating the T1 response better captured children’s actual performance 
than an unbiased  model33. The task-proficient monkeys do not appear to have such a bias against repeating a 
previous response.
It is also noteworthy that non-task-proficient capuchin monkeys did not perform like the task-proficient 
monkeys or the children in regard to source and information type. While they too were sensitive to the type of 
information provided in T1, repeating more after wins than loses, this difference was fairly small in the social 
and animated cue conditions. These monkeys also repeated more in the individual condition than in the other 
conditions; and they tended to repeat more after wins in the individual condition than in the other conditions. 
Perhaps this is due to the salience of receiving both direct (a raisin) and indirect reinforcement after a win in 
the individual condition. The salience of the feedback after win T1s in the social and animated cue conditions 
(visual and auditory cues, but no food, and experienced vicariously, rather than self-generated) may have been 
lower, leading to fewer repeats. While the performance of the task-proficient monkeys showed that some mem-
bers of this species were able to learn the significance of the information in T1 (and perform well regardless 
of source), the performance of the non-task-proficient monkeys indicated that they did not make as clear a 
distinction between win and lose T1s, and that there was differential sensitivity to this difference depending on 
the information source.
The non-task-proficient monkeys’ higher rates of repetition in the individual condition may hint at an alterna-
tive perspective on effects sometimes interpreted as showing that non-human primates exhibit relatively limited 
proclivity for social learning compared with humans. For example, evidence of limited observational learning in 
tasks that primates are nonetheless capable of mastering through individual trial-and-error (e.g.39) is perhaps bet-
ter understood as consequences of the subjects’ failure to understand the relevance of the task feedback (whether 
directly or vicariously experienced) as a guide to future action. This makes repetition of successful responses 
far more likely under individual learning as a result of simple reinforcement, as this requires no such insight, 
in contrast to social information use. This interpretation is bolstered by the contrasting pattern of performance 
in the task-proficient monkeys, who clearly did understand the relevance of the task cues, and showed limited 
effects of source, exhibiting a pattern of performance more similar to the children. If this interpretation is correct, 
apparent human advantages for social learning may reflect an understanding of the relevance of information 
regardless of source, in combination with a non-human advantage for learning from direct experience. We return 
to this point at the end of the Discussion.
The effect of array size requires careful interpretation, given the differing levels of chance performance 
between 2- and 3-stimulus arrays. Generally, non-task-proficient monkeys’ performance accorded with what 
would be expected based on chance levels and associative learning. That is, they repeated after wins more often 
with 2-stimulus (70%) than 3-stimulus (56%) arrays (reflecting the change in chance probabilities from 50 to 
33%), in line with a lower expectation of repeats when more stimuli are available if deviations from ceiling per-
formance are simply due to noise. They repeated after lose T1s more often in 2-stimulus (52%) than 3-stimulus 
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(38%) arrays, in line with the same principle. The performance of task-proficient monkeys and children was not 
affected by chance probabilities to nearly the same extent. This seems consistent with our interpretation that 
both the children and task-proficient monkeys recognised the predictive relevance of the task cues, in a way that 
the non-task-proficient monkeys did not (despite some differential responding to win/lose cues). Below-ceiling 
performance in these groups is therefore more likely to be attributable to competing biases or preferences (such 
as a motivation for exploration over exploitation in the  children40) rather than simple noise.
Had we found differences between the individual and social conditions, the animated cue condition would 
have assisted in examining the possible underlying mechanisms. The finding of non-differentially effec-
tive information use from an animated cue condition and a social condition by task-proficient monkeys and 
children is unusual, given that a number of previous studies have shown impoverished learning from ghost 
 conditions8–13,41–43, but  see14. It is possible that the difference between this study and the others is due to partici-
pants engaging in multiple trials, with corresponding opportunities to learn the game’s strategy. Children and 
monkeys might therefore have achieved better performance in this particular animated cue condition than in a 
one-off physical task. Another possible reason for the differing results is the simple, straightforward contingencies 
of our task. Children and monkeys did not need to learn complex object relationships or sequences to select an 
item that was (likely to be) rewarded, and were therefore able to easily utilise the information presented to them, 
regardless of its source. Finally, the selection of shapes in this task did not require fine motor control, meaning 
that individuals’ performance would not have been limited by the need to both create and execute a matching 
motor plan (the correspondence problem), as three-dimensional tasks might require.
The following limitations should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. First, the task was 
abstract, with limited ecological relevance to members of both species. Second, only 2 of 15 monkeys passed the 
performance criterion; it is possible that there was something special or different about these monkeys, and their 
performance may not generalise widely. Third, the social model—a human demonstrator for both species—may 
have had differential relevance for the two groups. However, if the status of the model as a conspecific (for the 
children) or heterospecific (for the monkeys) influenced performance, we would expect to see differences in the 
response to source conditions between the children and the task-proficient monkeys. Because each group treated 
social information similarly to both individual and animated cue information, the model’s status appears to have 
had minimal influence on the outcome.
How do our results relate to existing knowledge on social learning and cultural evolution in humans and 
non-human primates? Children have previously been found to have an apparent performance advantage over 
non-human primates in tasks involving the use of social  information44. In these tasks, children often use social 
information with ease, while non-human primates do not. However, given the results of the present study, 
this may not be due to a specialised adaptation for social information use among humans. Instead, it could be 
due to other factors, such as increased attention to social information, possibly as a result of developmental 
 experiences45, or a more general metacognitive ability to recognise the usefulness or significance of a variety of 
types of information, including that arising from social sources. If humans are able to recognise the utility of 
various types of information from the world around them, this may help to explain the apparent species unique-
ness of cumulative cultural evolution. In contrast, for non-human primates, associative cues may be more salient 
when experienced directly in response to an individual’s own activity rather than vicariously, as was the case for 
the non-task-proficient monkeys in this study, and to some extent the task-proficient monkeys as well.
In summary, in simple tasks like the one presented here, children and task-proficient capuchin monkeys do 
not seem to use social information in a unique way. Indeed, if anything, the task-proficient monkeys engaged 
in more copying after witnessing wins, across all conditions, than the children did. This result seems to indicate 
that, when the value of information is controlled for across conditions, the source of information is not the most 
important determinant of the future use of that information. We do not know whether this result would generalise 
to a more complex task which required greater use of cognitive resources. Such a question should be the topic of 
future research, which could usefully provide insight into species differences in information use on complex tasks.
Methods
Monkeys. Participants. We tested capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) at the Living Links to Human Evolu-
tion Research Centre at Edinburgh  Zoo46. At the time of this research, 35 capuchin monkeys in two social groups, 
East and West, were housed at the facility. These monkeys had previously been trained via positive reinforcement 
to enter the research cubicles, allow themselves to be temporarily separated from their group, and participate in 
cognitive testing. When separated from the group, a monkey could request to re-join its social group by touching 
the sliding door of the cubicle; experimenters opened the door to accommodate this, regardless of the point in a 
session in which this occurred. Research was therefore voluntary, and not every monkey participated. Details of 
the 17 monkeys who did participate in task training or testing are given in Supplementary Information Table S1. 
A further 4 monkeys participated in training to use the touchscreen but not frequently enough to progress to 
task training; and 14 monkeys never participated in any training or testing.
Ethical approval. Ethical approval for the primate research was granted by the Animal Welfare and Ethical 
Review Body at the University of Stirling, under application number AWERB (17/18) 025. Animals were not 
food or water deprived. Research was conducted in line with the guidance provided by The Association for the 
Study of Animal Behaviour (2017) in Guidelines for the treatment of animals in behavioural research and teach-
ing47.
Apparatus. To display the training and experimental tasks, we used a touch-sensitive monitor (Elo 1939L; 
37.5 cm [width] × 30 cm [height]) controlled via a tablet (Microsoft Surface). The custom programme for pre-
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senting the task was written in  PsychoPy48. The screen and tablet were placed on a mobile trolley for ease of 
movement. Monkeys interacted with the touchscreen through a front-facing cubicle window with a horizontal 
opening (see Fig. 1c).
Procedure. We planned to train monkeys on two training tasks, the first of which presented two stimuli in 
every problem and the second of which presented three. Once monkeys passed a performance criterion on both 
the 2-stimulus and 3-stimulus training tasks, they would progress to the experimental task. Our goal was to 
train and test as many monkeys as possible in the time period allotted; we thought it likely, however, that not all 
monkeys would pass all training levels. Additional details of the procedure are available in the Supplementary 
Information.
Training tasks. We previously trained the capuchin monkeys on a 2-stimulus task paradigm in one of two 
information source conditions (social or individual information only in all information  trials49). In this training 
task, monkeys were presented with problems that showed two stimuli on a background. Stimuli were shapes with 
a randomly generated number of sides and randomly assigned fill and outline colours, given the limits of platyr-
rhine colour  vision50. In the first trial (T1) of a training problem—the information trial—a monkey either saw 
the experimenter select a stimulus (social condition) or selected a stimulus themselves (individual condition). 
The monkey was then allowed to select a stimulus on the four subsequent trials of that problem (T2 through T5). 
After completing all five trials of a problem, they were presented five trials of the next problem, and so on. Each 
session had four problems, for a total of 20 trials per session. We focused our analyses on the second trial (T2) of 
each problem; the remaining trials in a problem were to reinforce learning of the task structure.
For half of the problems in a training session, the initial selection on the information trial was randomly 
assigned to be rewarded; for the other half, unrewarded. This was regardless of the identity or position of the 
stimulus, in order to prevent monkeys from developing side biases.
When the experimenter or monkey selected a rewarded stimulus, both stimuli disappeared, a sunburst visual 
cue appeared in place of the rewarded stimulus, and an auditory click was generated by the programme. Addi-
tionally, when monkeys selected a rewarded stimulus, they received a raisin. When an unrewarded stimulus was 
selected, all stimuli disappeared, a time-out screen showing only the background colour was displayed for 3 s, 
and no raisin was dispensed. For all trials in a given problem, the same stimulus, in the same location, was the 
rewarded stimulus. The purpose was to train the monkeys to recognise the predictive value of the cue revealed 
in T1 for the corresponding T2.
We established a performance criterion on the 2-stimulus training task for monkeys to progress to the 
3-stimulus training task. The criterion was ≥ 75% use of WSLS behaviour on the T2s in a session, in addition to 
performance (successful location of the rewarded stimulus) of ≥ 75% on T3 through T5 in that session, for three 
consecutive sessions. This is similar to performance criteria used in previous  research51.
The 3-stimulus training task was similar to the 2-stimulus task, but the number of stimuli was increased to 
3 (see Fig. 1a). The 3-stimulus training continued for each monkey in the same condition (social or individual) 
as their 2-stimulus training. With 3 stimuli, a win on T1 was more informative about the location of the reward 
than a lose.
The criteria to progress from the 3-stimulus training task to the experimental task were similar to those for 
progressing from 2-stimulus training: ≥ 75% use of WSLS on the T2s in a session, as well as ≥ 75% success on T3 
through T5, for three consecutive sessions. Note that this does not require finding the reward on T2 after a lose 
T1, but rather use of the strategy that could result in finding it. Some monkeys met this criterion; however, it 
became apparent that few additional monkeys would ultimately pass the 3-stimulus training criteria in the time 
allotted for this study. Therefore, after several months of testing, we allowed all monkeys who had participated 
in any 2-stimulus training sessions to progress to the experimental task. This enabled us to collect data from a 
larger number of monkeys, and to compare the performance of monkeys that had shown relative proficiency in 
training to that of those who had shown limited proficiency.
While meeting criterion on both training tasks was necessary for a monkey’s data to be analysed with the 
task-proficient group, it was not sufficient. For this we established an additional performance criterion, of contin-
ued > 75% WSLS performance on the experimental task. For additional details about this, see the Supplementary 
Information.
Experimental task. In the experimental task, as in training, a single session consisted of four different prob-
lems, with five trials per problem. Half of the four problems contained a 2-stimulus array, and half contained a 
3-stimulus array. T1s were performed by the same source (individual, social, animated cue) within each session; 
and the source differed between sessions in a pseudorandom order. In the individual condition, the monkey 
selected a stimulus on T1; in the social condition, the experimenter selected a stimulus; and in the animated cue 
condition, an animated hand selected a stimulus. Half of T1s were rewarded (wins), and half were unrewarded 
(loses). The number of sessions monkeys completed depended on how frequently they entered the testing cubi-
cles (range, 3 to 43).
Children. Participants. We tested children (N = 32; age 33 to 61 months; 17 female) at a University-based 
kindergarten in the United Kingdom. Data from three participants were excluded due to their participation in 
only two sessions, leaving a final sample of 29 children (15 female); three 2-year-olds, nineteen 3-year-olds, five 
4-year-olds, and two 5-year-olds.
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Ethical approval. Ethical approval for the child research was granted by the General University Ethics Panel 
at the University of Stirling, under application number GUEP467, and by the Stirling Psychology Ethics Com-
mittee. Research was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society Code of Human Research 
Ethics52.
When parents enrol their child in this kindergarten, they provide written informed consent for the child 
to participate in research conducted on-site. Parents are also given the opportunity to opt their child out of 
individual studies for any reason. For 2 weeks before data collection began, a notice with details of the research 
project and opt-out forms were placed on the kindergarten notice board. Any child whose parent(s) opted them 
out of participation was not asked to participate. Before testing, the experimenter sought each child’s assent to 
participate in a game; testing commenced only after the child agreed to play the game.
Apparatus. To display stimuli and record children’s responses, we used a touch-sensitive tablet with capacitive 
touch technology (23 cm [width] × 15 cm [height]). The custom programme used to present the task was written 
in  PsychoPy48.
Procedure. Each child was tested in three sessions on three separate days; testing sessions were at least 4 days 
apart. Each session used a different information source (individual, social, or animated cue), and the order of 
sources was counterbalanced across participants. In each session, a child was presented with 8 problems; these 
problems contained a random mix of win and lose information trials (50% each) and 2- and 3-stimulus arrays 
(50% each). Each problem had two trials: the information trial (T1) and a single test trial (T2).
Each child was given a sheet of paper with a picture of a cartoon dog. The experimenter told the child that in 
the game they were about to play, they would be looking for a ball (the sunburst), which was hiding. If the child 
found the ball, they could collect stickers on the sheet; the dog would like them to find as many balls as they 
could. For the paired trials, the first trial consisted of “taking a peek” and the second trial consisted of looking 
for the ball. For example, in the social condition, the experimenter said, “It’s my turn to take a peek first, and 
then you can look for the ball”. In the individual condition, the experimenter said, “It’s your turn to have a peek, 
and then you can look for the ball”. In the virtual condition, they said “Let’s take a peek first, and then you can 
look for the ball”.
After each information trial, the child performed the corresponding test trial (T2). On T2, if a child selected 
the rewarded item (“found the ball”), they were allowed to select a small sticker and place it onto their sticker 
sheet. If they did not select the rewarded item, the experimenter said, “Oh no, no ball! That’s OK, let’s do another 
one,” and the game continued with the next problem.
Statistical analyses. We analysed the data using generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) in the lme435 
and MCMCglmm36 packages in R version 3.6.353. Pairwise comparisons of main effects with more than two levels 
were done with the multcomp  package54.
Data availability
Data are available at https ://osf.io/pwt65 /.
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